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I. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY ARGUMENT 
The Appellant Dennis Sallaz argued in his opening brief that the district court erred in 
denying him an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). In response to this argument the 
Respondent Stephen has argued that: (1) Sallaz's appeal on this attorney fee question is untimely, 
as based upon the district court's December 1,2009 ruling; (2) that Sallaz is not entitled to an award 
of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) because the district court had ruled that Stephen was the lone 
prevailing party in the underlying malpractice action; and (3) that Sallaz failed to establish that he 
was a prevailing party in the underlying malpractice action. 
The Appellant Dennis Sallaz submits the following reply to the three arguments that the 
Respondent Stephen has made in opposition to the issue that he has raised on this appeal. 
A. Sallaz's Appeal Is Timely Based Upon The Actual Attorney Fee Order Made By The 
District Court Denying His Request For Attorney Fees That Was Entered On February 
9,2009 
The district court's order on the post-judgment requests for attorney fees was issued on 
February 9, 2009. (R., pg. 73). The original notice of appeal was filed 38 days later on March 19, 
2009, and was therefore timely within the jurisdictional 42 day time period allowed for filing an 
appeal nnder I.A.R. 14. 
The Respondent Stephen has argued that the Appellant Sallaz's March 19,2009 notice of 
appeal on the attorney fee issue is untimely as based upon the declaration that the district court made 
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in its October 3, 2008 memorandum decision that, "Plaintiff has prevailed in these proceedings and 
is entitled to ajudgment in the amount of$27,435.00." See, October 3, 2008 Findings of Fact at pg. 
14, as attached to Appellant's Motion to Augment the Record on Appeal. 
The district court did not declare that Stephen was a prevailing party for purposes of an 
attorney fee award until the January 15,2009 hearing on that request. (Tr., pg. 643, L. 21 to pg. 644, 
L. 4). This finding was incorporated into the district court's February 9,2009 jUdgment that made 
the award of costs, fees, and interest, which was the final appealable order under I.R.C.P. 58(a). (R., 
pp.73-74). 
Procedural due process protections apply to the right to both claim - and to oppose - an 
award of costs and attorney fees ina civil proceeding. Hooper v. State, 127 Idaho 945, 949, 908 P.2d 
1252, 1256 (Ct.App.l995); and Farber v. Howell, III Idaho 132, 136,721 P.2d 731,735 (Ct.App. 
1986). As applied in the context of a request for an award of costs and attorney fees this procedural 
due process right requires that all parties are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard either 
in support, or in opposition, on the issue of attorney fees, both as to entitlement and as to amount. 
Because the entitlement to an award of attorney fees is almost always dependent upon an 
initial determination by tlle court that the party making the request is a "prevailing party," the 
exercise of this due process right must necessarily include the right to challenge a party's 
characterization as the prevailing party under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). 
In this case the Respondent Stephen had maintained her claim for $450,000 in damages until 
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just shortly before trial. (Tr., pg. 636, LL. 11-20). At tlial she obtained a verdict amounting to only 
6% of the previously claimed $450,000, or $27,435. (October 3, 2008 Judgment, at page 14; 
December 1,2008 Judgment; attached as Document Nos. 7 & 8 to Appellant's Motion to Augment). 
Even though a party may have nominally prevailed in the action, it is not an infrequent occurrence 
for a court to determine that neither party prevailed in the action for purposes of an award of attorney 
fees. See e.g., Israel v. Leachman, 139 Idaho 24, 27, 72 P.3d 864, 867 (2003). There are also cases 
in which although the plaintiff may prevail in part on his or her primary claim, because the defendant 
has predominantly prevailed in the overall action, the defendant is determined to be the prevailing 
party. Shurtliffv. Northwest Pools, Inc., 120 Idaho 263, 269, 815 P.2d 461,467 (Ct.App.l991). 
The mere fact that the district court has declared that a party has prevailed for purposes of 
the entry of a money judgment, does not dispose ofthe question, or eliminate the right to challenge, 
that party's status as a "prevailing party" for purposes of an award of costs and attorney fees. In this 
case those questions were raised, heard, and decided by the district court subsequent to the entry of 
the December I, 2008 judgment. Neither the entry of the December I, 2008 judgment, nor its 
incorporation of any prevailing patty declaration that the district court had made in its October 3, 
2008 memorandum decision, conclusively established Stephen as a prevailing party in the action. 
Nor was atly other patty to the action precluded from challenging Stephen's status as a prevailing 
party for purposes of an award of attorney fees, nor was any other party precluded from asserting its 
own status as a prevailing patty in the action for purposes of an award of attorney fees. 
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Therefore, Sallaz's appeal is timely based upon the February 9, 2009 judgment. 
B. There Was No Ruling By The District Court That Stephen Was The Lone Prevailing 
Party 
The respondent Stephen has alleged in a number of places in her response brief that she was 
the lone prevailing party in the action below. See, Respondent Stephen's Brief at pp. 6, 7, II, 12, 
& 14. There is no support for this declaration in the record on appeal, and the district court never 
made such a finding. The civil rules allow for a determination of more than one prevailing party in 
an action. LR.C.P. S4(d)(I)(A) & (B). 
All of the parties to this action, including the Respondent Stephen, participating in the post-
judgment briefing and argument on cost and attorney fee issues that occurred after the entry of the 
December 1, 2008 judgment, that were heard on January 15,2009, and that were finally determined 
in the district court's February 9, 2009 memorandum decision and anlended judgment. Prior to her 
response argument on this appeal the Respondent Stephen had not during the course of that briefing 
and argument on the attorney fees issues before the district court previously raised or asserted any 
claim that she was the lone prevailing party. Stephen opposed the attorney fee claims made by the 
Defendant Sallaz in this action by addressing the substantive question of whether he was a prevailing 
party. (R., pp. 26-31). Consequently, there is no basis in the record on this appeal that supports the 
Respondent Stephen's claim that she was the lone prevailing party in this action. 
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C. Sallaz. Individually, Was A Prevailing Party In The Proceeding Below As A Matter Of 
Law 
On the post-judgment motions for costs and attorney fees the district court was presented 
with separate requests by the Plaintiff Stephen (R., pp. 20-35); by the Defendant Sallaz (R., pp. 14-
15); and the Defendant Gatewood (R., pp. 38-39). The district court dispensed with Mr. Gatewood's 
motion in three short sentences: 
The Court will deny Mr. Gatewood's Motion. Mr. Gatewood provides the 
Court with no basis to award him attorney fees or costs, and in any event, he was not 
a prevailing party. Thus under Rule 54(d)(l)(A), Mr. Gatewood is not entitled to 
attorney fees or costs. 
(R., pg. 70, LL. 16-19). 
In contrast, the district court expended four pages of its ten page memorandum decision 
issued on February 9, 2009 discussing each of the substantive claims for an award of costs and fees 
that had been made by Mr. Sallaz, including I.C. §§ 12-120(1), 12-120(3), & 12-121, and a request 
for Rule 11 sanctions. (R., pp. 66-70). Underlying this effort that was undertaken by the district 
court was the implicit finding that Mr. Sallaz was a prevailing party in the action who was entitled 
to request an award of attorney fees under the statutes cited just above. Notwithstanding the fact that 
the record on this appeal does not reveal any express declaration by the district court that Mr. Sallaz 
was a prevailing party, in the absence of such an actual finding on this question the district court's 
extensive analysis ofMr. Sallaz's claims would have been unnecessary and those claims could have 
been dispensed of in the same summary fashion as were the claims made by Mr. Gatewood, as set 
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out above. 
In Mr. Sallaz's opening brief on this appeal he argued that he was entitled to an award of 
attorney fees in the action below because he had obtained the most favorable outcome possible in 
that action. See, Appellant's Opening Brief at pg. 10. Mr. Sallaz prevailed individually as to the 
entire claim that had been made by Stephen in the malpractice action. The Idaho Court of Appeals 
in Daisy Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259, 999 P.2d 914 
(Ct.App.2000) held that under some circumstances the application of the prevailing party standards 
stated in LR.C.P. 54( d)(l )(B) require a determination that a party has prevailed in the action, as a 
matter of law. 134 Idaho at 262,999 P.2d at 917. In holding that Paintball was to be deemed a 
prevailing party as a matter of law in that case, the Court of Appeals observed that Daisy had only 
made a single claim against Paintball for the collection of an account receivable, against which 
Paintball had been successful in its defense. Id. Likewise, in this action, Sallaz in his individual 
capacity has avoided any liability whatsoever on Stephen's malpractice claim. 
InShore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 914-15, 204 P.3d 1114, 1125-26 (2009) the Court cited 
to both the decision in Eighteen Mile Ranch v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 117 
P.3d 130 (2005), upon which the Appellant Sallaz cited and relied in his opening brief, and to the 
decision in the Daisy Manufacturing case, as cited and discussed immediately above, in support of 
the proposition that "a defendant's nonliability is evidence that it is the prevailing party." 146 Idaho 
at 914, 204 P.3d at 1125. In Eighteen Mile Ranch the Nords argued on appeal that they were 
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prevailing parties in the action below, as a "matter of law." 141 Idaho at718, 117 P.3d at 132. 
Although the Supreme Court in ruling in favor of the Nords as prevailing parties in that case did not 
declare that status "as a matter of law," the Court did rely upon the Daisy Manufacturing decision, 
which is consistent with that result. 
Mr. Sallaz was joined individually as a party in the malpractice action by the stipulation of 
the parties. After the entry of the initial jUdgment on December 1,2008, the Respondent Stephen's 
motion for leave to amend to conform the pleadings to the evidence, which was made for the sole 
purpose of making Mr. Sallaz personally liable for the judgment entered, was denied. (Ir., pg. 630, 
1. 14 to pg. 631,1. 4; Ir., pg. 631, L1. 5-6). Nonetheless, Stephen persists in arguing on this appeal 
that Mr. Sallaz, individually, was not prevailing party in the action below because liability was 
imposed againstthe law firm of which he is a member. See, Respondent's Brief at pp. 14-16. Ihe 
law firm, as an entity, will meet its obligations either through insurance or from funds that have been 
received and accrued to the benefit of the firm itself, but not from Mr. Sallaz, individually. 
Consequently, this Court's determination of this issue on appeal should be limited to a determination 
of whether Mr. Sallaz, based only upon his individual capacity, was a prevailing party in the action 
below, and therefore entitled to an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). 
D. Conclusion 
Ihe only reason that was stated by the district court for denying the Appellant Sallaz his 
request for attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) was that, "the claim was not based on a commercial 
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transaction." (R., pg. 67). As argued in Mr. Sallaz's opening brief, that determination was in error 
based upon the decision in City a/McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009), which in 
turn was based upon the earlier decision in Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 152 
P.3d 594 (2007), which had overturned the long-standing rule that an award of attorney fees under 
I.e. § 12-120(3) could not be made in tort actions, notwithstanding the fact that the gravamen of the 
action was otherwise a commercial transaction. Therefore, as a prevailing party below, Mr. Sallaz 
was entitled to an award of attorney fees under I.e. § 12-120(3). 
II 
CROSS-RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT 
The Cross-Appellant Stephen has raised and argued the following three issues on her cross-
appeal to this Court. First, that the district court erred in failing to award Stephen any of the 
guardian ad litem costs on her motion for reconsideration. Second, that the district court erred in 
failing to make an award of attorney fees to her under I.C. § 12-120(3), even though she had made 
no request to the district court citing that statute. Third, that she is entitled to an award of attorney 
fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) on this appeal. 
The Cross-Respondents, Scott Gatewood and Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd., submit the 
following argument in response to, and denial of, the claims that the Cross-Respondent Stephen has 
raised on this appeal. 
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A. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying The Cross Appellant 
Stephen's Request For An Award Of The $7,500 Guardian Ad Litem Fee As An Item 
Of Discretionary Costs 
The Cross Appellant Stephen requested an award of$7 ,500 in discretionary costs for services 
rendered by the court-appointed guardian ad litem, Boise attorney Robert Wallace. (Tr. pg. 644,1. 
18 to pg. 647, 1. 14). At the January 15, 2009 hearing the district court inquired if Stephen had 
submitted any breakdown of this lump-sum request that would provide a detail of the services 
actually provided, and the amount billed for this specific service, by the guardian ad litem. (Tr., pg. 
645, 1. 20, to pg. 646, 1. 11). Counsel for Stephen indicated to the district court that this 
information had been inadvertently omitted from the affidavit submitted to the court in support of 
this particular claim for discretionary costs. (Tr., pg. 646, L1. 1-6). 
The district court was very clear in expressing the reason that it denied Stephen's request for 
an award of guardian ad litem fees, stating: 
Here, the Plaintiff requests $7,500 for the guardian ad litem fee of Robert 
Wallace. The Court will decline to award this fee because the Plaintiff has not 
presented a billing or other document setting forth a specific itemization of the fees 
that constitute $7,500 charged by Mr. Wallace. Rule 54(d)(5) provides that the 
prevailing party must itemize each claimed expense. Without evidence establishing 
the reasonableness and legitimacy of a $7,500 guardian ad litem fee, the Plaintiffhas 
not met her burden of showing that this cost was reasonably incurred and should in 
the interests of justice be assessed against the Defendants. Therefore, the Court lacks 
the specificity and basis on which to make an award for the guardian ad litem fee. 
In any event, it appears that Mr. Wallace's involvement in this case was peripheral 
at best. 
(R., pg. 64, 1. 24 to pg. 65, 1. 8). The documents submitted by the Cross-Appellant Stephen in her 
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December 23, 2009 motion to augment the record on this appeal do not provide the detail that was 
requested by the district court concerning this question. 
Stephen has alleged in the first full paragraph on page 17 of her opening brief to this Court 
that on her motion for reconsideration before the district court that she, "presented the very 
documents the Court indicated were necessary, but that were missing from the initial motion" and 
that Judge McLaughlin had "refused to consider the additional evidence." The record on appeal does 
not support this assertion as made by Stephen. 
The district court did consider the evidence submitted by Stephen before denying her motion 
for reconsideration. In the first paragraph ofthe district court's memorandum decision denying the 
motion for reconsideration it declared: 
The Court has had the opportunity to review the affidavit of Eric Clark as 
well as an affidavit submitted by Robert Wallace, who served as the Guardian Ad 
Litem for the Plaintiff, Pamela K. Joerger Stephen. 
(R., pg. 79). The district court then succinctly stated its reasoning in denying the motion for 
reconsideration: 
The Plaintiff is asking the Court to reconsider its previous decision declining 
to award discretionary costs. There is nothing in the affidavits submitted that is new 
or additional evidence upon which this Court can find a basis to reconsider the 
Amended Judgment filed by the Court along with the Memorandum Decision of 
February 9, 2009. Therefore, the Motion to Reconsider the Award of Discretionary 
Costs will be denied. 
(R., pg. 80). 
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Because the district court did in fact fully consider Stephen's motion for reconsideration, and 
on that motion she failed to supply the very specifically described and requested additional detail to 
justify any award of the guardian ad litem fees as discretionary costs, there was no abuse of 
discretion by the district court in denying her request for this discretionary cost. Furthermore, there 
is no support in the record on this appeal that this guardian ad litem costs was necessary and 
exceptional as required by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(D). In fact, as the district court observed, the guardian 
ad litem's participation at trial was deemed to be unnecessary. (Tr., pg. 645, L1. 9-12). Therefore 
this Court should uphold the district court's decision denying this request for discretionary costs. 
B. In The Absence of A Request By The Cross-Appellant Stephen For An Award Of 
Attornev Fees Under I.e. § 12-120(3), The District Court Lac\{ed Authority To Make 
A Sua Sponte Award Of Attorney Fees To Her Under That Statute 
At no time did the Cross-Appellant Stephen make a request for an award of attorney fees 
before the district court under I.C. § 12-120(3). Her request for attorney fees was limited to I.C. § 
12-121 (R., pg. 20), which was denied (Tr., pg. 642, L1. 22-25; Tr., pg. 643, LL. 12-17). 
Although there has been a steady increase in the number of Idaho statutes authorizing an 
award of attorney fees, Idaho still adheres to the "American Rule," that a party is not entitled to an 
award of attorney fees in the absence of a statutory authorization or a contractual provision. See e.g., 
Sanchez v. Dept. a/Correction, 143 Idaho 239, 243,141 PJd 1108, 1112 (2006). 
An important corollary to the American Rule is that a court caml0t make a sua sponte award 
of attorney fees to a party in the absence of a specific request that cites the particular statute that 
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authorizes the award. Bingham v. Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 423-24, 987 P.2d 
1035, 1038-39 (1999) ("The district judge's underlying assumption that he had the power to award 
fees on a basis not asserted by Montane is erroneous. In order to be awarded attorney fees, a party 
must actually assert the specific statute or common law rule on which the award is based; the district 
judge carmot sua sponte make the award or grant fees pursuant to a party's general request."). 
On this appeal the Cross-Appellant Stephen has argued in the second paragraph at page 22 
of her brief that, "she is entitled to recover under this statute because Sallaz' claim for these fees 
'triggered' the application ofthis statute entitling any prevailing party to recover." Stephen errs in 
her analysis. A three-step analysis is required when a court determines whether a right to attorney 
fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) exists: (1) the existence of a commercial transaction, (2) that the 
commercial transaction was the "gravamen" of the action, and (3) a party makes a specific request 
for attorney fees under the statute. See e.g., Gillingham Canst., Inc. v. Newby-Wiggins Canst., Inc., 
142 Idaho 15, 121 P.3d 946 (2005). 
The "trigger mechanism" argument, upon which Stephen relies in support ofher claims made 
on this appeal, only applies to the preliminary determinations concerning whether a particular case 
involved a commercial transaction that was the gravamen of the lawsuit, itself. As already argued 
above, the mere fact that a determination that a commercial transaction was the gravamen of the 
action, which would entitle any prevailing party to request attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3), does 
not relieve any party from the requirement of actually making a request for fees under that statute. 
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Stephen makes the argument at pp. 22-23 of her opening brief that two prior decisions of the 
Idaho Supreme Court support her argument that a party is entitled to an award of attorney fees under 
I.C. § 12-120(3), "even when a party had not specifically sought fees under this statute." A review 
of the appellate record in the two cases upon which Stephen has relied in support of her argument, 
Magic Lantern Productions, Inc. v. Do/sot, 126 Idaho 805, 892 P.2d 480 (1995) (attached as 
Appendix A to this brief); and Farmers Nat. Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63,878 P.2d 762 (1994) 
(attached as Appendix B to this brief), I reveals that in both cases an actual request for attorney fees 
under I.C. § 12-120(3) had been made by the prevailing party. 
In past practice, both ofIdaho' s appellate courts have examined the appellate record in earlier 
cases for the purpose of determining if a particular issue had been raised and decided in that prior 
decision. This appellate practice is revealed in the appellate decision record for State v. Charpentier, 
131 Idaho 649, 962 P.2d 1033 (1998). The two earlier- and unreported - appellate decisions by the 
Idaho Court of Appeals and the Idaho Supreme COUlt in Charpentier are attached as Appendices C 
& D to this brief, with the relevant text highlighted. In both of those unreported decisions the 
respective appellate courts indicated that they had reviewed the appellate record in an earlier 
decision, State v. Smith, 120 Idaho 77, 813 P.2d 888 (1991), on a question of interpretation of the 
The excerpts from the record on appeal for these two cases are submitted for 
information purposes only, and are not intended to supplement the record on appeal in this case. The 
full record on appeal in both cases was retrieved from Records Management for a fee paid by the 
Appellant, and reviewed and copied by Appellant's legal counsel after a review of those retrieved 
records in the Supreme Court Clerk's Office. 
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Idaho Constitution. 
Read in context, both the Magic Lantern and the Farmers cases may be fairly characterized 
as standing for the proposition that "any" prevailing party may advance a claim for attorney fees 
under I.C. § 12-120(3) when a commercial transaction is a gravamen of the action. But any 
possibility that these cases could have stood for the proposition asserted by Stephen on this appeal 
was expressly rejected in a subsequent decision, Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline 
Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 471, 36 P.3d 218, 223 (2001) where the Court declared that, "To the extent 
that Magic Lantern Productions, Inc. v. Dolsot, 126 Idaho 805, 808, 892 P .2d 480, 483 (1995) may 
be read to mandate an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party when the other party has claimed 
fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3), that interpretation is disavowed." 
Finally, the Cross-Appellant Stephen also argues that she should be entitled to an award of 
attorney fees under I.e. § 12-120(3) because she had reasonably relied upon the then-existing 
precedents that had otherwise barred such an award in attorney malpractice cases. See, Cross-
Appellant's Brief at pp. 17-19. Although the Court in Buxton expressly declared that the Wolters 
decision had been overruled, 146 Idaho at 665,201 P.3d at 638, the basis for that result was stated 
to be the 2007 Blimka decision. In the only subsequent decision to cite Wolters, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has declared that it was overruled by Blimka in 2007. See e.g., Callies v. O'Neal, 147 Idaho 
841,850,216 P.3d 130, 139 (2009). 
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Obviously the attorneys with the Moore Smith firm were perceptive enough to assert a claim 
for § 12-120(3) attorney fees in the Buxton case based upon the 2007 Blimka decision. Because 
Blimka had been in effect for almost two years at the time the attorney fee requests were made below 
in this case, an argument that Stephen should be excused from actually making a request for attorney 
fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) because the change in the law had recently occurred, does not appear to 
be well taken. 
C. Conclusion 
The Cross-Appellant Stephen should be denied the relief she has requested on her cross-
appeal. She has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion in denying her request 
for discretionary costs for the attorney fees incurred by the guardian ad litem. As a result of her 
failure to claim attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) below, she is precluded from now asserting a 
claim for fees under that statute on this appeal. Finally, in the absence of being determined a 
prevailing party on this appeal, the Cross-Appellant Stephen should be denied any award of attorney 
fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-120(3). 
III. 
SUMMARY 
The district court erred in denying an award of attorney fees to the Appellant Dennis Sallaz 
under I.C. § 12-120(3). This Court should reverse and remand this case to the district court with 
instructions to enter a judgment granting an award of attorney fees to Sallaz and to determine the 
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reasonable amount of attorney fees to which he is entitled. 
In addition this Court should also make an award of attorney fees on appeal to the Appellant 
Sallaz under I.C. § 12-120(3) and likewise issue a directive to the district court to determine the 
reasonable amount of attorney fees to be awarded to Sallaz in bringing this appeal. 
The Cross-Appellant Stephen should be denied any relief on her claims to an award of 
discretionary costs for the attorney fees incurred by the guardian ad litem, and also denied any relief 
on her claim to an award of attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3), which she did not claim below. 
Likewise, Stephen should be denied any award of attorney fees on appeal under I.C. § 12-120(3). 
Respectfully Submitted this 30th day of March 2010. 
Attorney for the Cross-Respondents 
Scott Gatewood and Sallaz & Gatewood, Chtd. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 30th day of March, 2010, two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPL Y BRIEF and CROSS RESPONDENTS' BRIEF were served 
upon the following: 
Eric R. Clark 
Clark & Associates, Attorneys 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208-685-2320 
Facsimile: 208-939-7136 
Email: eclark@clark-attorneys.com 
-.X U.S. Mail 
Facsimile 
Overnight Mail 
I-land Delivery 
Attorney for the Respondent/Cross Appellant 
Pamela K. Joerger Stephen 
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APPENDIX A 
APPENDIX A 
Bruce Collier, Esq. 
KNEELAND, KORB, COLLIER, LEGG & IIAUKAAS 
128 Saddle Road 
Post Office Box 249 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Telephone (208) 726-9311 
KKCL File No. 6074 
Attorneys for Defendants Dolsot and Block 56 
. '.: .'-./ ~,'.::-::, 
IN TilE DISTRICT COURT OF TilE FIFTII JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TilE STATE OF IDAIIO, IN AND FOR TilE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
MAGIC LANTERN PRODUCTIONS, INC., 
an Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 17149 
vs. 
) 
JOSEPH DOLSOT, an individual, ) 
THOMAS MONGE, an individual, ) 
BAIRD WOOLSEY, an individual, ) 
CINEMA PLAZA PARTNERS, an Idaho ) MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
partnership, and BLOCK 56 ) 
ASSOCIATES, an Idaho limited ) 
partnership and successor in ) 
interest to Cinema Plaza Partners, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
----------------------------) 
COMES NOW the Defendants, through their counsel of 
record, and pursuant to Rule 54(d)(5), I.R.C.P., submit the 
following Memorandum of Costs. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT 
Court filing fees 
Charges for reporting and 
reporting a deposition taken 
in preparation for trial. 
Charges for Court Recorder 
TOTAL COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT 
$ 33.00 
$ 956.00 
$ 5.00 
$ 994.00 
1. 
DISCRETIONARY COSTS 
Attorneys fees as supported by 
the affidavit of counsel which 
is filed concurrently herewith. 
2. Additional discretionary costs: 
i) 
il) 
iii) 
Phone Charges 
Facsimile Charges 
Photocopy Charges 
TOTAL DISCRETIONARY COSTS 
DATED this 
....,-1"" t I day of January, 1993. 
KNEELAND, KORB, COLLIER & LEGG 
By ;3~Urct t&.l~ 
Bruce Collier 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
5S. 
County of Blaine 
$13,856.25 
$ 
$ 
$ 
351.50 
100.20 
98.50 
$14,406.45 
COMES NOW, Bruce Collier, who being duly sworn on oath 
deposes and says: 
1. I am the attorney representing the party who has 
filed the foregoing Memorandum of Costs. 
2. To the best of knowledge and belief, the items 
stated in that Memorandum are correct and the costs claimed are in 
compliance with Rule 54(d)(5), I.R.C.P. 
DATED this 1- 7 JI-"'--day 0 f January, 1993. 
Bruce Coll ier 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me a Notary Public this 
1-'7~ 
____ ~--~ _____ day of January, 
(seal) 
eivw}t.\dolaot.2 
1993. 
, ,41tk ;:; _ {d. _ ~~UBLIC for Idaho 
Residing at I!-dt/(.LI~ ~ 
Commiss ion Expires: fl37/ g; 
21( 
Bruce Collier, Esq. 
KNEELAND, KORB, COLLIER, 
128 Saddle Road 
Post Office Box 249 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Telephone (208) 726-9311 
KKCL File No. 6074 
.... '.-.-.. --... --.... ~ ... 
LEGG & HAUKAAS 
Attorneys for Defendants Dolsot and Block 56 
.,- , 
, 
IN THE DIS'rRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
MAGIC LANTERN PRODUCTIONS, INC., 
an Idaho corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
JOSEPH DOLSOT, an individual, ) 
Case No. 17149 
., 
THOMAS MONGE, an individual, ) 
BAIRD WOOLSEY, an individual, ) 
CINEMA PLAZA PARTNERS, an Idaho ) 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF APPLICATION FOR 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
partnership, and BLOCK 56 ) 
ASSOCIATES, an Idaho limited ) 
partnership and successor in ) 
interest to Cinema Plaza Partners, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
------------------~-----------) 
STATE OF IDAHO 
ss. 
County of Blaine 
COMES NOW Bruce Collier, who being duly sworn on oath, 
deposes and ~says : 
1. I am a lawyer in the firm of Kneeland, Korb, Collier & 
Legg. That firm is counsel of record for Joseph Dolsot and Block 
56 Associates, the Defendants in this case. This affidavit is 
submitted pursuant to Rule 54(e)(5) IRCP. 
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2. During April, 1992, this law firm was contacted by 
Joseph Dolsot and Block 56 Associates with regard to legal 
representation in this action brought by the Plaintiff, and since 
such date, this law firm has been counsel of record for those 
Defendants in this case. 
3. Defendants' claim for attorney's fees in this case is 
based upon Idaho Code §12/120(3), §12-l2l and Rule 54{e){l) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Memorandum of Costs 
filed by the Defendants in this case includes an amount for 
attorneys fees and those fees were incurred by our clients in 
connection with the representation of the clients in this case. 
The attorneys fees therein set out are reasonable. The clients 
agreed to pay for attorneys fees based upon an hourly rate of 
$125.00. The amount of the attorneys fees noted in the 
Memorandum of Costs is based upon that hourly rate multiplied by 
the hours spent, resulting in a total attorney'i fee of 
$13,856.25.00. The actual number of hours spent is 110.85, and 
is reflected in the time entries made. True and correct copies 
of the statements presented to our clients showing the time and 
services rendered are attached hereto. 
/J1r--DATED this ~ day of January, 1993. 
. 
KNEELAND, KORB, COLLIER & LEGG 
Bruce Collier 
• 
January, 
(seal) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this j7'f'---day of 
1993. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I· HEREBY 
1993, I served a 
foregoing document 
noted: 
CERTIFY that on the ;)7"ft- day of January, 
true and correct copy of the within and 
upon the attorney named below in the manner 
clvwk\dolsot.l 
Michael Donovon, Esq. 
Roark, Donovon, Praggastis, 
Rivers & Phillips 
P.O. Box 3240 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
Richard Greener, Esq. 
Cosho Humphrey Greener & Welsh 
815 W. Washington St. 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
By depositing copies of the same in the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid, at the post office at Ketchum, 
Idaho. 
By hand delivering copies of the same to the office of 
the attorney at his/her offices. 
By telecopying copies of same to said attorney at his 
telecopier number , and by then 
mailing copies of the same in the United States Mail, 
postage prepaid, at the post office in Ketchum, Idaho. 
Bruce Collier 
•. 
Michael F. Donovan, Esq. 
ROARK, DONOVAN, PRAGGASTIS, 
RIVERS AND PHILLIPS 
Post Office Box 3240 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
(208) 726-5961 
Attorneys for Thomas Monge & 
Baird Woolsey, Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BLAINE 
MAGIC LANTERN PRODUCTIONS, ) 
INC., an Idaho corporation, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
JOSEPH DOLSOT, an individual) 
THOMAS MONGE, an individual,) 
BAIRD WOOLSEY, an individual) 
CINEMA PLAZA PARTNERS, an ) 
Idaho partnership, and BLOCK) 
56 ASSOCIATES, an Idaho ) 
limited partnership and ) 
successor in interest to ) 
Cinema Plaza Partners, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
-----------------------) 
STATE OF IDAHO 
ss. 
COUNTY OF BLAINE ) 
Case No. 17149 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL F. 
DONOVAN IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
MICHAEL F. DONOVAN, bein9. first duly sworn upon oath, deposes 
and states: 
1. That I am the attorney representing Defendants, Thomas 
Monge and Baird Woolsey, in the above-entitled action and I make 
this Affidavit based on my own personal knowledge and belief and am 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL F. DONOVAN IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS - 1 
fully competent to testify to the facts stated herein. 
2. In September, 1992 our firm was contacted by Defendants, 
Thomas Monge and Baird Woolsey with regard to the above-entitled 
matter. 
3. Defendants' claim for attorneys fees in this case is 
based upon Idaho Code Section 12-120 (3), and 12-121 and Rule 
54(e) (1) of the Idaho Rules of civil Procedure. The Memorandum of 
Costs filed by the Defendants in this case includes an amount for 
attorneys fees and those fees were incurred by our clients in 
connection with the representation of the clients in this case. 
The attorneys fees therein set out are reasonable. The 
clients agreed to pay for attorneys fees based upon an hourly rate 
of One Hundred Twenty-five Dollars ($125.00) for my services and 
One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) per hour for the services of Jennifer 
Kroos, an associate attorney employed by our law firm. The amount 
of the attorneys fees noted in the Memorandum of Costs is based 
upon that hourly rate multiplied by the hours spent, resulting in 
the total attorneys fees of Nine Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty-nine 
Dollars and Fifty Cents ($9,989.50) through December 26, 1992. 
Since that time, our firm has spent a total of 6.5 hours preparing 
for and attending the Hearing Re: Summary Judgment. Our firm will 
spend 3.5 additional hours preparing the Memorandum of Cost and 
Affidavit and attending a hearing on the Memorandum of Costs. 
Consequently, the total attorneys fees and costs are as 
follows: 
Costs $ 534.50 
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MEMORANDUM OF COSTS - 2 
Attorneys fees 
September - December 26, 1992 9,989.50 
Additional attorneys fees 
for Hearing Re: Summary Judgment, 
preparation of Memorandum of Costs 
and Attorneys fees and Hearing 
Re: Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorneys fees 1,250.00 
TOTAL $11,774.00 
True and correct copies of the statements presented to our 
clients showing the time and services rendered are attached hereto. 
DATED this ~ day of Febru , 1993. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
1993. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL F. DONOVAN IN SUPPORT OF 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS - 3 
I day of February, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the I day of February, 1993, I 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
MICHAEL F. DONOVAN IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM OF COSTS upon: 
/ 
Richard Greener, Esq. 
COSHO, HUMPHREY, GREENER & WELSH 
815 West Washington Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Bruce Collier, Esq. 
KNEELAND, KORB, COLLIER 
LEGG & HAUKAAS 
Post Office Box 249 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
By placing copies of the same in the united States 
Mail, postage prepaid. 
By hand-delivering copies of the same to the office 
of the above attorney(s). 
By express mailing copies of the same to the office 
of the above attorney(s). 
By telecopying 
attorney(s) at 
said copies in 
prepaid. 
copies of the same to the above 
?~ 9~ , and then placing 
the nlted States Mail, postage 
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APPENDIXB 
APPENDIXB 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
FARMERS 
vs 
CHARLES 
husband 
************** 
NATIONAL BANK, 
P1aintiff/Counterdefendant 
Respondent 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
P. SHIREY and SHAUNA SHIREY, ) 
and wife, ) 
Defendants/Counterc1aimants ) 
Appellants. ) 
) 
Supreme Court 20379 
CLERK'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District 
of the state of Idaho, in and for the County of Gooding. 
*************** 
HONORABLE R. BARRY WOOD, District Judge Pro tem 
KATHERYN A. STICKLEN 
COSHO, HUMPHREY & GREENER 
815 West Washington st. 
Boise, Id 83702 
*************** 
JOHN C. HOHNHORST 
HEPWORTH, NUNGESTER & LEZAMIZ 
PO BOX 389 
Twin Falls Id 83303-0389 
CHRONOLOGICAL SUPPLEMENTAL 
TABLE OF CON'fENTS PAGE (s) 
DEFENDANT's OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND FEES 1-6 
STIPULATION AND ORDER 7-9 
COURT MINUTES 10 
ORDER RE: COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 11-22 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 23-26 
PURSUANT TO THE SUPREME COURT JUNE 22, _1923 ORDER: 
SUPREl1E COURT ORDER----- -- - - - --- ---- -- - --- --- -- --- --- - 27 
DISTRICT COURT AMENDED JUDGMENT-----------------------28 
DISTRICT COURT SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL--------32 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Richard H. Greener 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
DISTRICT COURT 
GOODING CO. IDAHO 
FILE D 
, 92 DEC 22 Al'l 10 35 
COSHO, HUMPHREY, GREENER & WELSH, P.A. 
Attorneys and Counselors at Law 
Carnegie Library Building 
815 West Washington Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 344-7811 
Facsimile: (208) 338-3290 
6 Frank W. Stoppello 
STOPPELLO ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
7 620 West Hays Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
8 Telephone: 336-1020 
Facsimile: 336-1027 
9 
10 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Counterclaimants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING 
16 FARMERS NATIONAL BANK, 
17 
18 
19 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Counterdefendant, 
Case No. 20673 
CHARLES P. SHIREY and SHAUNA 
- 20 SHIREY, husband and wife, 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
AND MOTION TO DISALLOW 
COSTS AND FEES 
21 Defendants and 
Counterclaimants. 
22 11---____________________ __ 
23 
24 
25 
26 
COME NOW the Defendants and Counterclaims ( "Shireys" ) and 
object to Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees, and 
move to disallow the same as hereinbelow set forth, pursuant to 
Rules 54(d) (6) and 54(e) (6), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM OF COSTSI ATTORNEY FEES AND MOTION TO DISALLOW, P. I 
KAS/lsd 4553-001 <neff> shirey!obj/memo!costs 121892 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
I. COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT: 
A. Expert witness of $500.00 paid to Harry DeHaan for depo-
sition. Mr. DeHaan did not serve as an expert witness 
for any party in this case. He was counsel for the 
Shireys at the time some of the events at issue in this 
case occurred. Mr. DeHaan was deposed as a fact witness 
regarding his knowledge of these events. 
II. DISCRETIONARY COSTS: 
A. 
B. 
1. 
2. 
General Objection: Shireys object to the award of any 
discretionary costs to Plaintiff in this case on grounds 
that said costs were not "necessary and exceptional 
costs reasonably incurred" and should "in the interests 
of justice-be assessed against the adverse party." See 
Rule 54(d) (1) (D), Idaho Rules of civil Procedure. 
Specific Objections: 
Reproduction costs paid to Clerk of Bankruptcy Court of 
$91.00 for documents which were not used as exhibits. 
There is no showing that this expense was necessary, 
reasonable or taxable to the Shireys. 
Expert witness fees in-excess of $500.00. 
a. LEFORGE, ROGERS & EVANS. The necessity of retain-
ing an expert witness is not generally held to be 
an "exceptional" cost to be taxed as a discretion-
ary cost. See, Turner y. Willis, 116 Idaho 682, 
778 P.2d 804 (1989). 
OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM OF COSTS/ATTORNEY FEES AND MOTION TO DISALLOW, P. 2 
KAS/lsd 4553-001 <neff> shirey/obj/memo/costs 121892 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
16 
b. FRAZIER & TORBET, CPAs. Plaintiff has made abso-
lutely no showing as to why it was even necessary, 
let alone exception, to hire two CPA firms, let 
alone a "nationally-known CPA firm which special-
izes in accounting and related financial services 
to dairy farmers," especially where none of the 
work allegedly done was utilized at trial or in 
depositions. 
c. COLEMAN, McINTYRE, RITCHIE & ROBERTS, Attorneys. 
Again there is no showing that this was a neces-
sary or exceptional expense. Mr. Ritchie of the 
firm was, at best, a fact witness. He never tes-
tified in this case, and the Shireys should not be 
required to pay for his time. 
III. ATTORNEY FEES: 
Farmer's request for attorney fees under Idaho Code §12-120 
17 is not supported by the very defense that Farmers asserted in this 
18 case. Specifically, Farmers vigorously opposed the Shireys' claim 
19 for relief under the theory that no contractual relationship of 
20 any type existed between Farmers and the Shireys. The Shireys had 
21 specifically brought a breach of contract claim asserting third-
22 party beneficiary claims in support of their argument. Farmers 
23 vigorously fought all of those claims. Now, however, Farmers has 
24 taken the exact opposite tack in its request for attorney fees and 
25 it appears to argue that there was a contractual relationship 
26 
OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM OF COSTS/ATTORNEY FEES AND MOTION TO DISALLOW, 1'.3 
KAS/lsd 4SS3-001 <neff> shirey/ob'/memo/costs 121892 
1 between the bank and the Shireys (for the purpose of attorney 
2 fees). 
3 The Idaho Supreme Court has specifically held that in order 
4 to recover attorney fees under the statute, the action must have 
5 been one to recover on a contractual relationship and not merely 
6 an action arising from a transaction involving the purchase or 
7 sale of goods. Day y. CIBA Geigy Corporation, 115 Idaho 1015, 772 
8 P.2d 222 (1989). 
.; 9 
a. 
Our Court of Appeals has held that to 
recover attorney fees under the statute the 
action must be one to recover on the contract, 
not merely an action arising from the trans-
action relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods. [Omitting citations] 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Id., 115 Idaho at 1018. 
In Day, the Court specifically ruled that there was no con-
tractual relationship between the plaintiff and defendant and that 
there was no claim for breach of contract at the time the lawsuit 
was dismissed. 
In this case, the trial court twice ruled 
that there was no contract between CIBA Geigy 
as manufacturer of a product and Day as the 
purchaser of the product at the time of 
dismissal, the Days retain causes of action 
against CIBA Geigy for negligent labeling and 
breach of expressed warranty, but no action to 
recover on a contract. 
22 Id., ll5 Idaho at 1018. See, also, Brower y. B.l.. DuPont de 
23 Numours & Co., ll7 Idaho 780, 792 P.2d 345 (1990). 
24 Similarly, in this case, by virtue of the District Court's 
25 recent decision, the Shirey's breach of contract claim was 
26 
OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM OF COSTS/ATTORNEY FEES AND MOTION TO DISALLOW, P.4 
KAS/lsd 4553-001 <neff> shirey!obj/memo!costs 121892 
1 dismissed. There is no basis for Farmers to claim attorney fees 
2 under §12-120. 
3 In addition, the Shireys were required to file their compu1-
4 sory counterclaim in this case, and should not be penalized by an 
5 award of attorney fees for doing so, when the Bank commenced this 
6 litigation. 
7 An award of attorney fees under Idaho Code §12-121 or Rule 11 
8 is also inappropriate. As the Affidavit of John Hohnhorst, P1ain-
~ 9 tiff's counsel, states at paragraph 13, page 6, the litigation 
10 presented a variety of novel and unusual issues. Nowhere is there 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
any indication that the Shireys or their counsel acted fri vo-
lously, unreasonably or without foundation. 
DATED this ~day of December, 1992. 
COSHO, HUMPHREY, GREENER & WELSH, P.A. 
BY-r~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ____ ~ __ __ 
Kathry A. sticklen - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
OBJECTION TO MEMORANDUM OF COSTS/ATTORNEY F~:ES AND MOTION TO mSALLOW, 1'. 5 
KAS/lsd 4553-001 <neff> shirey/obj/memo/costs 121892 
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FILED V 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GOODING 
FARMERS NATIONAL BANK, ) 
) 
Plaintiff/ ) 
Counterdefendant ) 
vs 
CHARLES P. SHIREY and 
SHAUNA SHIREY, husband and 
wife, 
Defendant/ 
Counterclaimant, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 20673 
ORDER RE: COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
,( 
The hearing on the Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney's 
Fees and the Defendant's Objections thereto and Motion to Disallow 
Costs and Fees was heard on Friday, March 19, 1993. The matter was 
heard via telephone conference call pursuant to Rule 7(b)(4) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. All parties stipulated to the 
waiving of a live reporter and to hear the matter by telephone 
conference call. Mr. John Hohnhorst of Hepworth, Nungester and 
Lezamiz appeared on behalf of the plaintiff and counterdefendant, 
ORDER RE: COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES -11 
III. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Attorney's fees in the total sum of $90,760.35· are requested. 
These attorney's fees are further broken down into $6,308.00 for 
Stephan, Slavin, Kvanvig and Greenwood; $81,996.16 for Hepworth, 
Nungester and Lezamiz; and Computer-Assisted Legal Research 
$2,456.19. 
The attorney's fees are claimed on three basis. The first is Idaho 
Code §12-120(3) because this is a claimed commercial transaction. 
Fees are also claimed on the basis of §12-121 as being a frivolous 
action, namely the counterclaim was frivolous and that the 
complaint was defended frivolously. There is also a third claim 
pursuant to IRCP Rule 11. 
The Court will first answer the Idaho Code §12-121 and/or IRCP Rule 
11 applicability. Attorney's fees under this code section and rule 
are denied. On a factual basis, there is not a proper foundation 
at this point for the Court to make such a ruling. The Court did 
not hear any trial testimony or evidence. The Court thus has no 
foundation or basis to make a determination that the facts of the 
case are so frivolous that it would warrant an award of attorney's 
fees. As for a legal basis for the claim, the res judicata issue 
upon which the Court relied from the bankruptcy proceeding is not 
so clear as to make the Shirey's defense and counterclaim 
frivolous. The Shireys did promptly withdraw several causes of 
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action in their counterclaim once the Black Canyon Racquet Club, 
Inc. v The Idaho First National Bank, 119 Idaho 171, Decision was 
entered. See also Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, 
121 Idaho 266. 
Attorney's Fees pursuant to Idaho Code §12-120(3) are also objected 
to by the Shireys on the basis that the Court had found that there 
was no contractual relationship of any type existing between FNB 
and Shireys. 
FNB asserts that the test is not whether the Court ultimately found 
there was a contract but rather whether the commercial transaction 
involved in the case comprises the gravamen of the Shirey's law 
suit against FNB. The Court finds specifically that Shirey's claim 
was based upon an alleged "commercial transaction" of the type 
identified in Idaho Code §12-120(3) and further finds that the 
nature of the Shirey's claim triggers the statute even though FNB 
denied the existence of the triggering relationship, and 
notwithstanding the fact that the denial may be ultimately 
sustained. See Brower v. E.I. DuPont de Numours & Co., 117 Idaho 
780, and; see Twin Falls Livestock Commission Co. v Mid-Century 
Ins. Co., 117 Idaho 176. 
There is no claim that the attorney's fees as claimed are not 
reasonable and hence the attorney's fees are awarded in full as 
claimed. This includes the claim for Computer Assisted Research 
pursuant to Rule 54(e)(3)(K). 
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Attorney's fees are therefore awarded to FNB as the prevailing 
party pursuant to Idaho Code §12-120(3) in the sum of $90,760.35. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: ftr:J ]. l {9 f[ 5 
Signed: &iJo--J 
Roderick Barry Wood 
District Judge Pro Tern 
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McDEVITT, Justice 
ON REVIEW 
This case is on review from an Idaho Court of Appeals 
decision reversing the district court's order suppressing 
evidence seized during a vehicle search incident to arrest, 
conducted pursuant to the rule in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 
454 (1981). The district court granted the motion to suppress, 
ruling that Article I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution 
provides greater protection against a warrantless search incident 
to arrest than does the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
1. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The court minutes from Charpentier's preliminary hearing 
indicate that the arresting officer was questioned and cross 
examined. The record also contains a request from Charpentier 
for a transcript of the preliminary hearing. However, that 
transcript is not part of the clerk's record on appeal. The only 
facts in the record are those set forth in the arresting 
officer's affidavit, and those contained in the Statement of 
Facts section of the district court's opinion. 
The district court found that the parties did not dispute 
the facts. We quote from the arresting officer's statement in 
the affidavit of probable cause, contained in the record: 
I was going South on Nez Perce Grade when I saw a 
White 1984 Honda coming towards me at what appeared to 
be 50 MPH in a 35 MPH zone. I activated my moving 
radar in unit # 138 and checked the suspect vehicle[']s 
speed at 53 MPH for 5 seconds. I also counter verified 
the patrol speed on the radar with the dash at 30 MPH. 
I turned around on the suspect vehicle and stopped it . 
. I approached the driver and she said "I know I 
was speeding." She also told me, "I need to hurry and 
get to [a car dealership in Lewiston] and pick up my 
car". . The driver was very upset and quick in her 
movements. She was begging me to just let her go 
without checking her driving status. She finally 
identified herself with an Idaho [driver's license) as 
Terina Charpentier. 
A check of her driving status found she had a 
Court Ordered Suspension out of Latah County and a 
restricted license. A check with Latah County found 
she was only able to drive to and from work and on 
emergencies. Charpentier told me she was to be to work 
at 1700 Hrs., but was going to [the car dealership) to 
have her vehicle worked on [on) the way to work. 
I placed Charpentier under arrest and placed her 
in the rear of my unit. I searched her car . 
incident to arrest. During the search, I found a 
baggie of a white powdery substance that looked like 
Talc powder. I took it back to Charpentier and she 
told me it was powder for her work gloves. I then went 
back to the car and looked inside her work gloves. I 
located a small amount of marijuana in a plastic 
baggie. I went back to Charpentier and asked her what 
the substance was in the baggie? Charpentier told me 
it was crank that belonged to her. She then said the 
marijuana was not hers. I looked closer in the glove 
and saw a small red/green pouch that contained a 
plastic baggie with a yellow/white substance and a 
plastic straw. I also found another plastic straw in a 
finger of the glove. I seized the above items. I then 
advised Charpentier [of) her Constitutional Rights 
which she acknowledged and said she would answer my 
questions . I asked Charpentier again if it was 
crank and she said it was. She also told me she had 
gotten the crank this last weekend to try to see if she 
liked it. She then told me the marijuana belonged to 
her friend [A.]. Charpentier did not give me any 
further information on who [A.] was or where she got 
the crank. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate the precise location 
of the methamphetamine when the officer found it in the car. The 
district court found that Charpentier was removed from her 
vehicle, handcuffed, and placed in the patrol car. 
Charpentier moved to suppress the methamphetamine after 
pleading not guilty. The sole issue considered by the district 
court was" [w]hen a defendant, following a traffic stop, has been 
removed from a vehicle, handcuffed and placed in a patrol car, 
does Idaho Const. art. I § 17 permit a search of the passenger 
compartment of a vehicle, including containers, as an incident of 
that traffic arrest?" 
After a hearing on that issue, during which the arresting 
officer was examined and cross-examined, the district court ruled 
that although the search was clearly permissible under the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution as interpreted in New 
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), the Idaho Supreme Court had 
not yet determined whether Idaho Constitution art. I, § 17 
provides greater protection in this context. Therefore, the 
district court stated that 
[t]his Court is satisfied that in traffic arrests when 
an arrestee is not in possession or general control of 
the area within which there is access to a weapon or 
destructible evidence of the crime which triggered the 
arrest, or where there is no readily apparent 
opportunity for escape, the need to search evaporates. 
In the absence of any precedent to the contrary and in 
light of what this Court deems the inherent danger of 
bright-line rules to the sanctity of Idaho citizens' 
privacy rights, this Court finds Chimel [v. California, 
395 U.S. 752 (1965)] instructive and hereby adopts its 
reasoning as a proper limitation on the exercise of 
police power under Article I, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision, 
holding that the Idaho Supreme Court had implicitly addressed 
this issue in State v. Smith, 120 Idaho 77, 813 P.2d 888 (1991), 
when it stated that "Idaho has adopted the rule in Belton." Id. 
at 80, 813 P.2d at 891 (citing State v. Calegar, 104 Idaho 526, 
661 P.2d 311 (1983». We granted Charpentier's petition for 
review. 
2. 
ISSUE 
Was the officer's warrantless search of the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle, immediately following the driver's 
arrest, a valid search incident to arrest under art. I, § 17 of 
the Idaho Constitution? 
3. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On the denial of a motion to suppress, this Court will 
overturn a trial court's factual findings only if they are 
clearly erroneous. State v. Peightal, 122 Idaho 5, 7, 830 P.2d 
516, 518 (1992). However, this Court exercises free review over 
questions of law, including whether the trial court correctly 
applied the law to the facts. Id.; State v. Weber, 116 Idaho 
449, 451-52, 776 P.2d 458, 460-61 (1989) 
4. 
ANALYSIS 
On appeal, the State urges this Court to adopt the rule set 
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Belton, and to use 
that rule when analyzing art. I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. 
In contrast, Charpentier and the Idaho Attorneys for Criminal 
Justice, Inc., writing as amicus curiae, ask us to adopt the 
case-by-case approach announced in Chimel. Under Chimel, absent 
probable cause, the arresting officer may only search the 
arrestee and "the area 'within his immediate control' --
construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he 
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." 
Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763. Belton set forth the bright line rule 
that when an officer makes a valid arrest, he or she may search 
the passenger compartment of the vehicle, including any locked or 
unlocked compartments or containers. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. 
We decline the State's invitation. 
A. The Idaho Constitution Has Been Interpreted 
Independently Of The United States Constitution 
And In Such A Way As To Provide More Protection To 
Idaho Citizens. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
art. I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution are virtually identical.' 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution states that: 
However, we, as a state court, are free to construe our state 
constitution in a manner which offers more protection to Idaho 
citizens than the interpretation given the United States 
Constitution. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 
80-82 (1980); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 987, 842 P.2d 660, 
666 (1992). This Court has also recognized that freedom when it 
stated that: 
It is thus readily apparent that state courts are at 
liberty to find within the provisions of their own 
constitutions greater protection than is afforded under 
the federal constitution as interpreted by the United 
States Supreme Court. This is true even when the 
constitutional provisions implicated contain similar 
phraseology. Long gone are the days when state courts 
will blindly apply United States Supreme Court 
interpretation and methodology when in the process of 
interpreting their own constitutions. 
State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 10 n.6, 696 P.2d 856, 861 n.6 
(1985) (citation omitted) . 
B. State v. Smith And Other Prior Idaho Case Law Did 
Not Address Whether The BeLton Rule Should Be Used When 
Analyzing A Case Under Art. I, § 17 Of The Idaho 
Constitution. 
In State v. Smith, 120 Idaho 77, 813 P.2d 888 (1991), the 
Court stated that "Idaho has adopted the rule in Belton." Smi.th, 
120 Idaho at 80, 813 P.2d at 891. However, the Court did not 
state that Idaho had adopted Belton as the rule for interpreting 
the Idaho Constitution. Belton has been applied by this Court 
only as to Fourth Amendment issues. We have thoroughly reviewed 
the briefs in Smith. The issue of the application of Belton 
under article I, § 17, was not raised by the parties in that 
case. Smith acknowledged that one search which was conducted 
contemporaneously with his arrest was a valid search incident to 
arrest, and further, did not argue that Idaho should have a rule 
which provided greater protection than Belton. Smith's main 
suppression arguments centered around the Vehicle Identification 
Number (VIN) search rule and the inventory search rule, neither 
of which are at issue in this case, and neither of which involve 
the Belton rule. The State argued that the inventory search 
could have also been a valid search incident to arrest. However, 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, honses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized. 
it only argued that it was valid under Belton and the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and did not address 
the Idaho Constitutional issue specifically raised in this case. 
This issue has never been addressed, and since it has been 
properly raised by the appellant, we will address it. 
C. Chimel v. California And New York v. Belton. 
In Chimel v. California, the United States Supreme Court 
considered the scope of the search incident to arrest exception 
to the warrant requirement, and noted that "whenever 
practicable," officers should obtain a search warrant before 
searching a person or place. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762. However, 
the Court also held that: 
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the 
arresting officer to search the person arrested in 
order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek 
to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. 
Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be 
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In 
addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting 
officer to search for and seize any evidence on the 
arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment 
or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee 
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary 
items must, of course, be governed by a like rule . 
. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search 
of the arrestee's person and the area "within his 
immediate control" -- construing that phrase to mean 
the area from within which he might gain possession of 
a weapon or destructible evidence. 
Id. at 762-63 (emphasis added) . 
Although Chimel did not involve a vehicle search incident to 
arrest, the language emphasized in the preceding quotation has 
been used to justify the warrantless search of an automobile 
after a person inside the car had been arrested. The rationale 
for including the passenger compartment and any containers 
therein within the scope of the search incident to arrest was 
that the compartment and containers had been or were still within 
the arrestee's reach, and therefore placed at risk the officer's 
safety or the possible destruction of evidence. Id. at 460. 
D. When A Person Has Been Validly Arrested, And Removed 
from the Motor Vehicle They Were Operating, The Officer 
May Not Conduct A Search Of The Vehicle's Passenger 
Compartment Incident To The Arrest. 
The search incident to arrest exception, whether involving 
vehicles or not, was created to minimize danger to an officer, 
and to prevent the loss or destruction of potential evidence. 
When the operator of a motor vehicle is arrested and removed 
from that motor vehicle the rationale of officer safety and fear 
of destruction of evidence no longer exists. Article I, Section 
17 of the Idaho Constitution affords our citizens protection from 
searching their motor vehicle incident to arrest under such 
circumstances where there is not any risk to officer safety or 
the destruction of evidence. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
Under art. I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution, the police 
may not search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to 
the valid arrest of the driver or passenger in that car, when the 
operator is removed from the vehicle. The decision of the trial 
court is affirmed. 
Chief Justice TROUT and Justice JOHNSON CONCUR. 
Justice SILAK, DISSENTS. 
Although I concur with parts I, II, III, and IV(A) , IV(B), 
and IV(C) of the Court's opinion, I dissent from the holding in 
Part IV(D) that when a person has been validly arrested and 
removed from the motor vehicle, the arresting officer may not 
conduct a search incident to arrest of the motor vehicle's 
passenger compartment where there is not a risk of the 
destruction of evidence or a risk to the officer's safety. If 
the Court is basing its holding on the assumption that those 
risks will be eliminated because the arrestee is handcuffed and 
in the car, that is, in my view, an incorrect assumption. As I 
discuss below, there is still a risk that a passerby or 
accomplice might obtain a weapon or evidence which remains in the 
vehicle. 
If, on the other hand, the Court is holding that a vehicle 
search incident to arrest might still be conducted if there is 
shown to be a risk to the officer's safety or a risk of the 
destruction of evidence, such a holding is a restatement of the 
rule in Chimel. That rule proved to be unworkable and 
unpredictable. As the United States Supreme Court noted in 
Belton, the Chimel rule proved itself difficult to apply, and 
yielded a wide range of judicial results. Belton, 453 U.S. at 
459. The Chimel rule was also problematic for citizens and law 
enforcement officers because " [w]hen a person cannot know how a 
court will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual 
situation, that person cannot know the scope of his 
constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of 
his authority." Id. at 459-60. The Court eloquently stated the 
pitfalls of the Chimel rule when it noted that: 
"Fourth Amendment doctrine, given force and effect by 
the exclusionary rule, is primarily intended to 
regulate the police in their day-to-day activities and 
thus ought to be expressed in terms that are readily 
applicable by the police in the context of the law 
enforcement activities in which they are necessarily 
engaged. A highly sophisticated set of rules, 
qualified by all sorts of ifs, and, and buts and 
requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline 
distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which 
the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, 
but they may be 'literally impossible of application by 
the officer in the field. '" 
Belton, 453 U.S. at 458 (quoting LaFave, "Case-By-Case 
Adj udi ca tion" Versus "Standa rdi zed Procedures": The Rob.inson 
Dilemma, 1974 S. Ct. Rev. 127, 142). 
Therefore, in Belton, the Court set down the following 
bright-line rule regarding vehicle searches incident to arrest: 
(W]e hold that when a (police officer] has made a 
lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an 
automobile, (the officer] may, as a contemporaneous 
incident of that arrest, search the passenger 
compartment of that automobile. 
It follows from this conclusion that the police 
may also examine the contents of any containers found 
within the passenger compartment, for if the passenger 
compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also 
will containers in it be within his reach. 
Id. at 460. The Belton Court also emphasized that "(o]ur 
holding today does no more than determine the meaning of Chimel's 
principles in this particular and problematic context. It in no 
way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel 
case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful 
custodial arrests." Id. at 460, n.3. 
The search incident to arrest exception, whether involving 
vehicles or not, was created to minimize danger to an officer, 
and to prevent the loss or destruction of potential evidence. 
When the search is of a person, or the area within his or her 
"wingspan", it is easy to see how an immediate search incident to 
arrest will further those goals. The question does indeed become 
more difficult when the search involves an automobile, and the 
suspect is no longer in the automobile. 
We have long recognized that a person has a lesser 
expectation of privacy in an automobile than in a home. Although 
written in the context of a case considering the automobile 
exception to a search warrant, 2 we noted "that 'configuration, 
2 Under the automobile exception, police may search an automobile after they have stopped 
it on a street or highway, if they have probable cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime or 
contraband. See State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 93, 625 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1981). This 
use, and regulation of automobiles often may dilute the 
reasonable expectation of privacy that exists with respect to 
differently situated property. '" State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 
90, 93, 625 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1981). Even though the United 
States Supreme Court rested its rationale in Belton on the lawful 
custodial arrest, rather than the diminished expectation of 
privacy one has in an automobile, the reduced expectation of 
privacy still lends support to my analysis. 
Further, the fact remains that even if the defendant is 
handcuffed and in the rear seat of a patrol car, the rationales 
behind the search incident to arrest apply. For example, the 
vehicle could contain a weapon that could be accessed by an 
accomplice or a passerby if the weapon is not secured. The 
officer's safety, and that of the public, remains potentially at 
risk, and that risk can only be minimized by ensuring that there 
are no easily accessible weapons in the passenger compartment. 
Similarly, the officer should be able to search the passenger 
compartment of the car for evidence or contraband. The fact that 
a vehicle's driver is no longer in the car does not necessarily 
mean that any evidence or contraband is secure. An accomplice or 
passerby could still enter the vehicle and remove the evidence or 
contraband. 
Although I disagree with the majority, I would not go as 
far, for purposes of Idaho Constitution art. I, § 17 analysis, as 
the United States Supreme Court did in Belton. The Belton Court 
defined containers as any object capable of holding another 
object. It thus includes closed or open glove compartments, 
consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere within the 
passenger compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing, 
and the like. Our holding encompasses only the interior of the 
passenger compartment of an automobile and does not encompass the 
trunk. Id. at 461 n.4. 
However, the Court did not distinguish between locked and 
unlocked containers. Lower federal courts subsequently held that 
Belton permits the search of locked containers located or found 
within the passenger compartment of a vehicle. Seer e.g' r United 
States v. Woody, 55 F.3d 1257, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that 
"[w]e are not persuaded by Woody's argument that the fact that 
the glove box was locked precluded the possibility that Woody or 
one of his passengers could have retrieved a weapon hidden within 
it. "); United States v. Valiant, 873 F.2d 205, 206 (8th Cir. 
1989) (holding that" [b]ecause the locked briefcase was a closed 
container within that vehicle, it lawfully could be searched."); 
United States v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868, 871-2 (8th Cir. 1985) 
(noting that Belton allows the search of a locked glove 
compartment as part of a search incident to arrest) . 
I would hold that under art. I, § 17 of the Idaho 
exception has been used to justify the search of an automobile's trunk. Id. 
Constitution, "when a [police officer] has made a lawful 
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, [the officer] 
may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the 
passenger compartment of that automobile." Bel.ton, 453 U.S. at 
460. I would decline, however, for Idaho constitutional 
analysis, to extend the vehicle search incident to arrest rule as 
far as the Belton court did. Because it permits a search of 
anything within the passenger compartment of the vehicle, Belton 
is overly intrusive. Further, that decision undermines the 
warrant requirement, and goes beyond what might be required by 
the exigencies of an arrest situation. If there is a locked 
glove compartment or other locked, permanently affixed container 
in the passenger compartment, the rationale behind the search 
incident to arrest rule is weaker. If a weapon, evidence or 
contraband is in a locked compartment or container which is 
permanently affixed to the vehicle, it will not easily be reached 
by a passerby or anyone else. In that situation, assuming none 
of the other exceptions to the warrant requirement are 
applicable, the officer will have time to obtain a search warrant 
for the locked compartment, without risk to public safety, the 
officer's safety or without risk of destruction of contraband or 
evidence. While a person may have a decreased expectation of 
privacy in a vehicle, he or she does not have a diminished 
expectation in locked compartments within that automobile. The 
very fact that someone takes the time to lock the compartment is 
a manifestation of the intent that its contents remain secure and 
private. As discussed above, a valid custodial arrest is born of 
and gives rise to a set of circumstances whereby it becomes 
important that an officer be allowed to search the person and the 
passenger compartment. However, when a compartment is locked, 
that importance is diminished, particularly in light of the 
increased expectation of privacy one has in locked compartments. 
I would further hold, however, that the container must be 
locked, not merely closed. An officer may search a container or 
compartment which is merely closed, because it may still be 
opened relatively easily. Further, the officer may search any 
locked or unlocked container which is not permanently affixed to 
the vehicle. Such portable containers which are not permanently 
affixed could be easily removed from the vehicle by an accomplice 
or passerby. Thus, the officer or others could be exposed to a 
risk of harm from a weapon, or evidence or contraband could be 
lost. 
The Washington Supreme Court has adopted a similar rule, 
although that court prohibited the search of any locked 
containers, whether or not affixed to the vehicle. 3 That court 
3 We note that the text of Washington's search and seizure provision differs from both the 
Fourth Amendment and art. I, § 17. Article I, § 7 of the Washington State Constitution provides 
that "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of 
also balanced the rationale behind a search incident to arrest 
against the reduced expectation of privacy, and held that the 
Washington State Constitution "affords individuals greater 
protections against warrantless searches than does the Fourth 
Amendment." State v. Stroud, 720 P.2d 436, 439 (Wash. 1986). 
That court then explained that: 
We agree with the [United States Supreme] Court that 
[the Belton exigencies] exist. However, because of our 
heightened privacy protection we do not believe that 
these exigencies always allow a search. Rather, these 
exigencies must be balanced against whatever privacy 
interests the individual has against the articles in 
the car. 
To weigh the actual exigent circumstances against 
the actual privacy interest on a case by case basis 
would create too difficult a rule to allow for both 
effective police enforcement and also protection of 
individual rights. However, a reasonable balance can 
be struck. During the arrest process, including the 
time immediately subsequent to the suspect's being 
arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car, 
officers should be allowed to search the passenger 
compartment of a vehicle for weapons or destructible 
evidence. However, if the officers encounter a locked 
container or locked glove compartment, they may not 
unlock and search either container without obtaining a 
warrant. The rationale for this is twofold. First, by 
locking the container, the individual has shown that he 
or she reasonably expects the contents to remain 
private. Secondly, the danger that the individual 
could destroy or hide evidence located within the 
container or grab a weapon is minimized. The 
individual would have to spend time unlocking the 
container, during which time the officers have an 
opportunity to prevent the individual's access to the 
contents of the container. 
Stroud, 720 P.2d 440-41. 
In summary, I would hold that under art. I, § 17 of the 
Idaho Constitution, the police may search the passenger 
compartment of a vehicle contemporaneous with the valid arrest of 
the occupant of that car, even if the arrestee has been 
handcuffed and placed in the officer's patrol car. However, 
absent a warrant, or a warrant exception other than the search 
incident to arrest, the officer may not search locked, 
law." 
permanently affixed containers or compartments in the passenger 
compartment, but may search locked portable containers. 
Justice SCHROEDER DISSENTS. 
I respectfully dissent from the Court's determination in 
Part IV that the rule announced in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 
454 (1991), is not applicable in interpreting Article I, Section 
17 of the Idaho Constitution. This Court adopted the Belton rule 
in State v. Smith, 120 Idaho 77, 813 P.2d 888 (1991), stating 
that "Idaho has adopted the rule in Belton," 120 Idaho at 80, 813 
P.2d at 891. This statement cannot be explained away as simply 
acknowledging the applicability of the rule in interpreting 
rights under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for 
two reasons: (1) the statement has no meaning in that context; 
and (2) the question of interpreting the Idaho Constitution was 
placed before the Court by Justice Bistline's dissent, which one 
must assume was not ignored. 
"Idaho has adopted the rule in Belton" is a statement that 
clearly says what it says. In interpreting the U.S. Constitution 
there is no rule for Idaho to adopt. The U.S. Supreme Court is 
the final authority on the meaning of the U.S. Constitution, and 
Idaho must follow that interpretation, like it or not. Idaho 
does not "adopt" a U.S. Supreme Court interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment. Idaho must follow the interpretation. Hence, 
the statement that "Idaho has adopted the rule in Belton," only 
makes sense if it is a ruling that Idaho follows the rationale of 
Belton in its own jurisprudence. 
The fact that the parties in Smith did not argue a different 
interpretation of Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution 
from the Fourth Amendment is not dispositive. The interpretation 
of Article I, Section 17 was placed squarely before the Court by 
Justice Bistline's dissent. Early in the dissent Justice 
Bistline observed that, "[tlhe fourth amendment to the United 
States Constitution and art. I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution 
protect the people of Idaho against unreasonable searches and 
seizures." Smith, 120 Idaho at 81, 813 P.2d at 893. Justice 
Bistline continues, "The fourth amendment and art. I, § 17 allow 
for the exclusion of evidence that is obtained as a result of an 
illegal search or seizure." Id. The issue of a search incident 
to an arrest was discussed extensively in the next section of the 
dissent, and the conclusion of the dissent returned to the Idaho 
Constitution: 
Neither the inventory search exception or the search 
incident to arrest exception properly applies to the 
search conducted in this case. The warrantless search 
was therefore unreasonable and violated the fourth 
amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 1, 
§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution. 
120 Idaho at 86, 813 P.2d at 897. 
In the context of the issues before the Court and the 
language used, it is clear that Smith adopted the Belton rules as 
its interpretation of Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution. Following the precedent in Smith, the order of the 
district court suppressing the evidence should be reversed. 
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Terina L. Charpentier was charged with one count of possession of a controlled substance. 
I.C. § 37-2732(c)(l). She filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, which the district court 
granted. The state appeals from the suppression order. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse 
the order and remand the case for further proceedings. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The parties do not dispute the relevant facts in this case. The district court summarized them 
as follows: 
On August 31, 1994, Officer J. Mabey of the Lewiston Police Department, at 
approximately 2:00 p.m., observed a small white vehicle traveling at approximately 
53 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. speed zone. When Mabey stopped the car, he discovered 
that the driver'S, [Terina L.] Charpentier, driving privileges were suspended and 
further determined that her restricted license did not extend to the period during 
which she was stopped. As a result, Charpentier was arrested for driving without 
privileges. She was handcuffed and placed in Mabey's patrol car. Mabey then 
returned to Charpentier's vehicle and, relying upon the search incident to an arrest 
exception to the warrant requirement, searched the car and found a small amount of 
a substance resembling marijuana and two plastic stTaWS. He also found and opened 
a small pouch which in turn contained a plastic baggie in which a yellow-white 
substance and two plastic straws were found. The latter substance tested positive as 
Methamphetamine. 
The district court also found that the search of the car was conducted immediately after the officer 
placed Charpentier in the patrol car. The record shows that the methamphetamine was found inside 
a glove which was located on the passenger seat of the vehicle. 
Charpentier was charged by information with possession of a controlled substance, a felony, 
pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732(c)(l). She pled not guilty to the charge, and the matter was set for ajury 
trial. She filed a pretrial motion seeking to suppress the methamphetamine. Following a hearing, 
the district court issued an order granting the motion. The state has appealed from this order. 
II. ISSUE 
The sole issue in this case is whether the district court erred in granting Charpentier's motion 
to suppress evidence based on the court's conclusion that following a traffic stop, Charpentier's 
custodial arrest, handcuffing and placement in the patrol car rendered the subsequent warrantless 
search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle unreasonable under Article I, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
III. DISCUSSION 
In her motion to suppress, Charpentier alleged that the methamphetamine was seized: (1) 
during a search which was not incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) without a warrant in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution; and (3) without a warrant in violation of 
Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. The district court found that the search was made incident 
to a proper arrest. The court also held that the acts of the officer did not violate the federal 
constitution because of the rule in New forkv. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 
(1981). J The district court, however, granted the motion on the basis that the search was invalid 
under Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution. The court concluded that the Idaho Supreme Court 
had not addressed the validity of a warrantless search of a vehicle, made incident to an arrest, under 
Art. I, § 17, and that the Idaho Constitution should be interpreted so as to place more restrictions on 
police conduct than is provided under the federal constitution. The district court therefore adopted 
the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 
In Belton, the United States Supreme Court stated that: 
[W]e hold that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the 
occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, 
search the passenger compartment of that automobile. 
It follows from this conclusion that the police may also examine the 
contents of any containers found within the passenger compartment, for if the 
passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in it 
be within his reach. Such a container may, of course, be searched whether it is 
open or closed, since the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no 
privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the 
infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have. 
453 U.S. at 460-61, 101 S.Ct. at 2864,69 L.Ed.2d at 775 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), and its progeny. These cases essentially provide a case-by-case 
approach for searches incident to an arrest as advocated by the dissent in Belton. 
When a violation of a constitutional right is asserted through a motion to suppress, the proper 
appellate response is one of deference to the trial court's factual findings unless those findings are 
clearly erroneous. State v. Peightal, 122 Idaho 5, 7, 830 P.2d 516, 518 (1992); State v. Knapp, 120 
Idaho 343, 346, 815 P.2d 1083, 1086 (Ct. App. 1991). However, the appellate court exercises free 
review over the trial COUlt's determination as to whether constitutional requirements have been 
satisfied in light of the facts found. ld. 
The Idaho Supreme Court followed the rule in Belton under circumstances where there is a 
warrantless search, made incident to a lawful arrest, and the validity of the search has been 
questioned under the Fourth Amendment. See e.g., Stale v. Smith, 120 Idaho 77,813 P.2d 888 
(1991); State v. Calegar, 104 Idaho 526, 661 P.2d 311 (1983). We disagree with the district court's 
conclusion that the issue in this case, with regard to the Idaho Constitution, has never been addressed 
by our Supreme Court. We believe it was implicitly addressed in State v. Smith, supra. 
In Smith, the defendant was stopped by an officer for speeding and driving erratically. As 
the officer approached the vehicle, he observed Smith reaching under the seat as if to either hide or 
retrieve something. The officer told Smith to keep his hands in plain sight and ordered him out of 
the car. When asked why he was reaching under the seat, Smith replied that there was a loaded gun 
in the car. He was immediately handcuffed and the officer called for backup. A search of the 
vehicle revealed a loaded handgun. Smith was then searched and arrested for carrying a concealed 
weapon. After questioning the defendant regarding the ownership of the vehicle, the officer 
suspected that the vehicle was stolen. The vehicle was impounded and an inventory search 
uncovered a bag containing cocaine. Smith was charged, in pertinent part, with possession of a 
controlled substance. Smith then filed a pretrial motion to suppress the cocaine. The trial court 
reduced the cocaine charge to simple possession and denied the suppression motion. After Smith 
entered a conditional plea of guilty to the reduced charge, the trial court withheld judgment and 
placed him on probation. Smith appealed from the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress. 
In its opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court did not outline in detail the arguments Smith 
presented on appeal. A reading ofthe majority opinion leads one to believe that Smith argued only 
that the search was invalid under the Fourth Amendment. However, Justice Bistline's dissent 
specifically addressed both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1 
§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution. To clarify the question as to what arguments were actually presented 
to the Idaho Supreme Court in Smith, this Court retrieved the briefs in Smith from the Idaho State 
Law Library, located in Boise. A review of those briefs discloses that Smith presented the same state 
and federal constitutional arguments on his appeal that Charpentier has presented to this Court. In 
Smith, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of the suppression motion on the basis 
that, "Idaho has adopted the rule in Belton." 120 Idaho at 80, 813 P.2d at 891. Because the validity 
of the automobile search under Belton circumstances was clearly challenged by Smith under both 
the federal and the Idaho Constitutions and the Idaho Supreme Court did not distinguish the 
applicability of the two Constitutions with respect to the search of Smith's automobile incident to 
his arrest, we conclude that the Idaho Supreme Court accepted Belton as the rule for interpreting 
Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution in the type of situation now presented by Charpentier. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the rule in Belton should be applied in determining whether a warrantless 
search, made incident to a lawful arrest, was reasonable under Article I, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution. We hold that the district court erroneously granted the suppression motion. The 
district court's order granting Charpentier's motion to suppress the evidence is reversed and the case 
is remanded for further proceedings. 
Judges LANSING and PERRY, CONCUR. 
